Emotivism

McIntyre begins by asking why it is that contemporary moral debates (about abortion, war or homosexuality for example) are characterised by their interminablity and by their shrill tone. There never seems to be a resolution in such debates, the various positions within the debates appear to be incommensurable, and this leads to the widely held position in our culture that “all evaluative judgements and more specifically all moral judgements are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling“ - a view McIntyre calls “emotivism.” Emotivists hold that there can be no rational or other grounds for making judgements among rival moral positions, so that all moral debate is essentially an exercise in rhetorical persuasion. So pervasive is this position that “to a large degree people now think, talk and act as if emotivism were true, no matter what their avowed theoretical standpoint may be. Emotivism has become embodied in our culture."

Quoting A MacIntyre's After Virtue in Evangelism after Christendom, Bryan Stone 2007, p132

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